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he inter-sectoral migration of agricultural labour is a complex but 
fundamental process of economic development largely affected by the growth 
of agricultural productivity and the evolution of the agricultural relative 
income gap. Theory and some recent anecdotal evidence suggest that as an effect of 
large fixed and sunk costs of off-farm migration, the productivity gap between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors should behave non-monotonically or 
follow a U-shaped evolution during economic development. Whether or not this 
relationship holds true across a sample of 38 developing and developed countries 
and across more than 200 EU regions was empirically tested. Results strongly 
confirm this relationship, which also emphasises the role played by national 
agricultural policy.  
 
1. Introduction 
Changes in resource allocation as a result of structural changes such as 
across-sector labour reallocation represent one of the most important 
engines driving economic growth and development. The most complex 
form of resource adjustment during economic development is the 
migration of labour out of the agricultural sector. Labour is the most 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Olper, Raimondi, Bertoni & Cavicchioli, “Patterns and 
Determinants of Off-Farm Migration: Transfer frictions and persistency of relative 
income gaps”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 36, February 2013. 
T 
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important factor in determining national income. Therefore, countries that 
manage to pull themselves out of poverty are those that are able to 
diversify away from the agricultural sector. This occurs because labour 
moves from agriculture into the industrial sector, with overall productivity 
rising and income growing due to sector convergence in labour 
productivity. However, the speed with which this structural transformation 
takes place is a fundamental factor that differentiates successful countries 
and regions from unsuccessful ones (McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).  
One of the key variables that both governs and is affected by 
structural change is the existence of productivity gaps between sectors. 
Large differences in labour productivity across sectors are traditionally 
found in developing countries, but also across regions in more developed 
countries such as member states of the EU. These differences are at the 
heart of allocative inefficiencies that ultimately reduce overall GDP per 
capita. Consequently, understanding the magnitude and dynamics of the 
actual income gap between the agriculture and non-agricultural sector is 
useful in speculating about the potential gains from off-farm labour 
migration and the convergence process.  
As emphasised by dual-economy models (Lewis, 1954), the 
productivity gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural parts of the 
economy behaves non-monotonically during economic growth. It shows a 
gap that first increases and then falls, and forms a U-shaped pattern during 
economic development. One of the key reasons behind this pattern is found 
in the lower rate of agricultural labour reallocation compared to other 
production factors, as a consequence of the fixed and sunk costs that 
farmers incur when they move between sectors (Mundlak, 2000; Dennis & 
Iscan, 2007).47  
McMillan & Rodrik (2011) documented interesting stylised facts in 
support of this relationship for a sample of 38 developed and developing 
countries. Similarly, Hayami (2007) reports evidence of this relationship for 
high-performing economies in Asia, suggesting that their transition from a 
low-income to a middle-income stage through industrialisation has 
generated a widening income gap between farm and non-farm workers, 
                                                     
47 This ‘transfer problem’ of agricultural labour out-migration was documented 
several years ago by Shultz (1964) and Johnson (1951) among others. For a more 
recent assessment see Mundlak (2000), Timmer (1988), Williamson (1988), and 
Dennis & Iscan (2007). 
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corresponding to rapid shifts in comparative advantage from agriculture to 
manufacturing. The same author makes the point that in order to prevent 
this income disparity from culminating in serious social and political 
instability, policies have been reoriented toward supporting the income of 
farmers. 
On the other hand, a variety of evidence has been presented 
regarding China (see Yang & Zhou, 1999; Yang, 1999) with reports of how 
urban bias in government policy has been a fundamental determinant of 
the increase in rural-urban income disparity. Interestingly, these authors 
have shown that during the economic reforms of the 1970s, China 
substituted government constraints on rural-urban migration with urban-
biased policies. These policies contributed substantially to the increase of 
income inequality in China during the 1980s and 1990s.48  
These stylised facts, associated with policies that traditionally tax 
farmers in low-income countries and support them in developed countries, 
make it difficult to use observed sectoral incomes to document the non-
monotonic relationship between the relative agricultural income gap and 
economic development.  
This chapter has two aims. First, we analyse patterns of inter-sectoral 
agricultural labour migration as well as patterns of sectoral productivity 
growth and agricultural relative income gaps, across both countries and EU 
regions. Second, we test empirically whether or not the supposed U-shaped 
relationship between the relative agricultural productivity gap and the 
level of development represents a robust regularity, taking into 
consideration the role played by agricultural policy. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, data and variables 
used to estimate off-farm labour migration at both the international and EU 
regional level, as well as data on sectoral productivities and agricultural 
policy, are presented. Section 3 deals with the analysis of the patterns of 
off-farm migration and productivity growth. In Section 4, we perform an 
econometric test to see whether or not the relationship between the 
                                                     
48 Data on inequality decomposition in Chinese provinces indicates that rural-
urban income differentials constitute a large share of total inequality, and the 
widening sectoral gaps from 1985 to 1995 have caused rising inequality in China. 
Yang (1999) shows that the rise in sectoral disparity is due to increased urban-
biased policies such as subsidies, investments, and credits, which have resulted in 
higher rates of inflation on rural earnings. 
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agricultural productivity gap and development is robust to different 
specifications and country samples, and controlling for agricultural policy. 
Finally, Section 5 discusses the main implications and draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Data and variables 
To study the patterns of off-farm labour migration49 and the relationship 
between the relative agricultural income gap50 and economic development, 
data was collected at both the international and EU regional level. The 
dataset assembled by McMillan & Rodrik (2011) was used for international 
comparison with sectoral data on employment, value added, and labour 
productivity for 38 countries over the period 1990-2005 (annual data). The 
original dataset is based on data taken from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (GGDC) integrated with 11 countries (9 African 
countries plus China and Turkey). The GGDC database has two sections: 
the 10-sector database (Timmer & de Vries, 2007) and the EU-KLEM 
database (Timmer et al., 2007). 
The 10-sector database provides sector-level information on 
employment and value added for 19 countries (10 Asian and 9 Latin 
American) over the period 1950–2005. The EU-KLEM database has been 
built with the same methodology and time coverage to integrate the 10-
sector database with data on 8 OECD countries (7 European countries plus 
the US). To take advantage of a wider number of observations, the dataset 
of McMillan & Rodrik was added to the observations of the 10-sector 
database and the EU-KLEM Database before 1990. Table A.1 in the 
                                                     
49 Using agricultural employment information from country (region) datasets, the 
off-farm migration rate was computed according to the following equation: 
mkt=(Awk(t-1)- Awkt)/Awk(t-1), where Awkt refers to ‘agricultural workers’ in the 
country/region k at the time t. This type of computation has positive values in the 
presence of off-farm migration and negative values with the migration of workers 
into agricultural sectors from other sectors. 
50 The income gaps between the agricultural and non-agricultural parts of the 
economy were computed by dividing agricultural by non-agricultural labour 
productivity. Therefore, a low ratio indicates huge differences in productivity 
between agricultural and other economic sectors (high productivity gap), and vice 
versa. Agricultural and non-agricultural productivity was computed by dividing 
the sectoral value added by the corresponding level of employment. 
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Appendix reports country and time coverage of the pooled dataset used in 
the analysis presented in this chapter. 
The international dataset is complemented with data of the 
agricultural nominal rate of assistance (NRA) from the World Bank 
“Agdistortions Database” (see Anderson & Valenzuela, 2008). The NRA is 
calculated as = (
)

 , where P is the actual domestic price in local 
currency and P1 is the estimated domestic price that would hold in the 
absence of any commodity-market or exchange-rate intervention. 
Consequently, the NRA is like an equivalent tariff measuring the total 
transfer to agricultural products (sector) as a percentage of the undistorted 
unit values. The NRA is positive when the product is subsidised, negative 
when it is taxed, and 0 when net transfers are zero.  
At the EU regional level, the data for the analysis of off-farm 
migration within the EU covers 154 regions of the 15 ‘old’ EU countries51 
and 56 regions of the 12 new member states throughout the period 1990–
2010.52 Table A.2 in the Appendix describes the number of regions used for 
each country according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) and distinguishing between NUTS1 and NUTS2. The 
decision to use both NUTS1 and NUTS2 is motivated by the need to link 
data from different sources. Indeed, the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) regional classification that was used to retrieve data about 
agricultural subsidies from the CAP does not always match the NUTS2 
level defined by Eurostat.  
The EU regional data are taken from Cambridge Econometrics’ 
Regional Database, which represents an improvement on and 
rationalisation of the Eurostat Regio series. Specifically, data on total and 
agricultural gross value added and sectoral employment was collected 
from this source to measure both off-farm migration and the relative 
agricultural income gap. Labour productivity is calculated as gross value 
added (GVA) per worker at constant and basic prices. The difference 
                                                     
51 Luxembourg is coded as a NUTS1 (and NUTS2) single region. Information could 
not be found for the four French overseas departments, the two Portuguese regions 
of Madeira and Azores, the two Greek regions of Voreio Aigaio and Notio Aigaio, 
and the Åland region in Finland due to lack of data. 
52 Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Malta are coded as NUTS1 (and NUTS2) 
single regions. 
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between total GVA and GVA in agriculture, also for non-agricultural 
employment, was used for the non-agriculture sector.  
Concerning the measurement of CAP payments at the EU regional 
level, the FADN data was exploited in accordance with Olper et al. (2012). 
Specifically, the amount of payments received by the ‘average farm’ in each 
year over the period 1990–2010 in every region covered by the FADN was 
obtained. The extent to which the average farm is representative of the 
farm population,53 and then the computation of the ratio between this farm 
CAP payments and the respective farm net income (including subsidies), 
means it is possible to measure a consistent regional level of farm 
protection due to different CAP policy measures. Note that in addition to 
only being based on farm subsidies, this indicator of agricultural protection 
measured at the regional level is conceptually different from the NRA used 
to estimate agricultural protection in the international dataset. However, 
this is the only source of data from which it is possible to measure the level 
of farm subsidies at regional level consistently.  
3. Patterns of off-farm labour migration, productivity and 
income gaps 
3.1 Off-farm migration 
Tables 19.1 and 19.2 report the mean value of off-farm migration rate, 
agricultural labour productivity, the relative income gap, and agricultural 
productivity growth for the 38 countries and 209 European regions, 
respectively. In order to understand the off-farm migration rate over time 
more clearly, Figures 19.1 and 19.2 plot migration values for each country 
and region, respectively. In the figures, the average migration rates of the 
two subsequent decades are reported on the y and x axis, respectively. As 
the farm migration can range from negative to positive values, each graph 
is divided into four quadrants.  
                                                     
53 For each region, the FADN sample is stratified according to the type of farming 
(TF) and the European size unit (ESU) class, while the same stratification is made 
on the regional farm population. Each stratum in the sample is then weighted to 
render its data representative of the underlying population. This procedure makes 
the FADN data representative at the regional level for TF and ESU and, indirectly, 
for Pillar I payments, while this is not the case for Pillar II payments. 
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Table 19.1 Migration rate and agricultural labour productivity at country group 
level (mean value for each decade)  
 
Source: our estimates from McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
N. Obs
Migration 
rate         
(%)
Agricultural 
labour 
productivity 
(US$)
Productivity 
Gap
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Growth      
(%)
1990-2000 83 -1.361 3,852 0.28 1.22
2000-2010 65 -0.743 6,221 0.35 2.67
1960-1970 30 -0.353 2,164 0.29 3.71
1970-1980 74 -0.494 5,130 0.34 2.59
1980-1990 91 1.143 7,980 0.39 2.64
1990-2000 109 1.850 8,992 0.35 2.01
2000-2010 72 0.031 10,040 0.32 2.97
1950-1960 56 2.163 5,146 0.25 4.57
1960-1970 89 4.070 8,231 0.32 5.79
1970-1980 90 2.536 13,252 0.39 4.33
1980-1990 90 2.584 20,784 0.53 5.23
1990-2000 90 2.424 32,298 0.71 3.91
2000-2010 54 2.002 41,830 0.83 2.32
1950-1960 72 -0.606 3,237 0.19 2.43
1960-1970 89 -0.464 4,087 0.19 2.84
1970-1980 90 -0.325 5,452 0.23 2.67
1980-1990 90 -1.667 6,490 0.30 0.90
1990-2000 90 0.101 8,241 0.39 3.29
2000-2010 54 -0.361 10,654 0.51 2.65
9 High-income 
countries
9 Latin American 
countries
9 African countries
10 Asian countries + 
Turkey
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Table 19.2 Migration rate and agricultural labour productivity at European 
regional level (mean value for each decade)  
 
Source: our estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (see text). 
N. Obs
Migration 
rate         
(%)
Agricultural 
labour 
productivity 
(Euros)
Productivity 
Gap
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Growth      
(%)
1990-2000 2310 2.53 32,381 0.54 4.47
2000-2010 2100 1.71 37,533 0.65 2.39
EU15 regions
1990-2000 1694 2.68 41,184 0.56 5.06
2000-2010 1540 1.18 46,946 0.64 1.35
12NMSs regions
1990-2000 616 2.11 8,245 0.49 2.84
2000-2010 560 3.15 11,649 0.69 5.25
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Figure 19.1 Global off-farm migration rates during decades (1950s to 2000s) 
 
Source: our estimates based on McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Figure 19.2 Off-farm migration rates in EU regions during the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Source: our estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database. 
Starting from the international country dataset (see Figure 19.1), high-
income countries (OECD), which are symbolised in the graph by a square, 
always fall in the first quadrant and are characterised by a positive 
migration rate in both decades. In particular, all of these countries show 
average migration increasing during the 1960s (first graph) from 2.2% to 
4%, but in contrast, they experience a general reduction of migration rates 
during the 1970s (second graph) as highlighted by the observations above 
the diagonal line. Exceptions are France and Japan, maintaining the same 
migration rate in this period, and Spain where migration continued to 
increase. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the high-income countries had an 
evident and persistent off-farm migration rate as seen in their position very 
close to the diagonal line and by the average migration value permanently 
close to 2.5% (Table 19.1, third and fourth quadrants). The behaviour of 
low-income countries is very different and symbolised on the graph by 
circles, which generally fill the third quadrant (negative migration in both 
periods) and present an inflow of labour into the agricultural sector from 
1950 to 1990. By contrast, the 2000s saw a marked acceleration in the off-
farm migration rate in these countries, which has become a pervasive 
feature for most of them, showing a reversal of the trend.  
Examining the EU-27 regions, the off-farm migration rate presents a 
slight decrease over the last two decades (1990s and 2000s), falling from 
2.53% to 1.71%. However, when the EU-15 regions are considered 
EU15 regions
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separately, there is a bigger drop in the average migration rate from 2.68% 
to 1.18% (Table 19.2). The individual region performance shows that most 
of the EU-15 regions have a migration rate that slows down between 
decades, as highlighted in Figure 19.2 by the observations above the 
diagonal line. Only a few regions had a different pattern, with migration 
increasing (especially in Spain and Belgium) or migration being reversed 
(in some UK regions). By contrast, regions in new member states show a 
strong average increase of migration rate through the two decades from 
2.11% to 3.15%, but with two different behaviours. One group of regions 
(Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) presents a decrease in 
off-farm migration, while in the other group of regions, especially 
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania, off-farm migration reversed, 
moving from a negative value in the 1990s, to high positive values in the 
2000s.  
3.2 Productivity and migration 
The choice to migrate from the agricultural sector is influenced by 
incentives such as sectoral income. Consequently, the larger the income gap 
between sectors, the stronger the migration rate (Mundlak, 2000), ceteris 
paribus. At the same time, when labour moves from less to more productive 
activities, the economy grows even if there is no growth in productivity 
within sectors. Note moreover that, when off-farm migration contributes to 
an increase in agricultural labour productivity and this increase is greater 
than the non-agricultural productivity growth, agricultural relative income 
brings about convergence in sectoral incomes. This positive relationship 
between migration and the speed of convergence is shown in Figure 19.3 
and Figure 19.4, where these variables are plotted at the country and 
regional level, respectively.54 Although this pattern is apparent in all 
country groups, the value of the average productivity gap over the decades 
highlights deep differences in the speed of convergence between 
agricultural versus non-agricultural income (see Tables 19.1 and 19.2). In 
particular, in developed countries, where the migration rate has always 
been above 2%, agricultural productivity growth over the last 60 years 
filled the large gap in labour productivity between the traditional and 
modern parts of the economy, with the highest productivity difference 
being in Japan and the lowest in the UK. Conversely, the process of 
reduction in the gap between sectoral productivity presents a different 
                                                     
54 Convergence speed is computed as the relative agricultural income gap growth. 
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speed in developing countries, where the possibility that displaced workers 
could finish in even lower-productivity activities cannot be ruled out 
(McMillan & Rodrik, 2011). This convergence process is more evident in 
Latin American countries, despite the negative value of the average 
migration, where the labour force seems to have moved from high- to low-
productivity activities. In contrast, the relative income gap in the Asian 
countries changes slightly and the agricultural labour productivity has 
continuously remained at one-third that of the non-agricultural sector over 
the last 50 years.  
Figure 19.3 Relationship between migration and labour productivity convergence 
speed in world countries 
 
Source: our estimates based on the McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Figure 19.4 Relationship between migration and labour productivity convergence 
speed in European regions 
 
Source: our estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (see text). 
It is easier to see what has happened at the European regional level, 
where the dynamic reproduces what has already been described for high-
income countries in the last two decades. The exception are regions in new 
member states, where average off-farm migration and agricultural 
productivity markedly increased over the last decade, reducing the 
differentials in productivities despite the big differences in labour 
productivity levels. Indeed, the agricultural labour productivity of 
European regions during the 2000s ranged from a minimum in the 
Bulgarian region of Severozapaden, with a productivity of €2,072, to a 
maximum in the Dutch region of Groningen, where labour productivity is 
over €90,000, almost 45 times greater (see Table A.4 in the Appendix).  
4. The agricultural productivity gap and economic 
development  
Whether or not there is a U-shaped relationship between the relative 
agricultural income gap and development at both the international and EU 
regional level is now empirically tested. The economic logic behind this U-
shaped relationship is that if economic growth occurs, the modern and 
‘urban’ sectors of the economy expand and the gap between them and the 
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traditional agricultural sectors begins to widen. Therefore, up to a certain 
point, labour begins to move from traditional agriculture to the modern 
part of the economy. Beyond this point, productivity levels begin to 
converge within the economy and productivity diffuses throughout the rest 
of the economy, thereby reducing the productivity gap. 
Figure 19.5 shows the relationship between the country level of 
development, measured as the (log) of economy-wide labour productivity, 
and the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural productivity with reference 
to all of the 38 countries and to a sub-sample of the nine high-income 
countries. As highlighted in Figure 19.5, the quadratic curve with its U-
shaped pattern fits the data very well, the turning point being at an 
economy-wide productivity level of around $7.259 (=exp(8.8)) per worker. 
This value corresponds to the development level of China and India in the 
2000s or Thailand in the mid-1980s, and represents the kind of turning 
point that most of the African countries included in the dataset are still 
waiting for. By contrast, all the high-income economies show labour 
productivity levels that started their convergence process between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors many years ago. 
Figure 19.5 Relationship between economy development level and productivity gap 
 
Note: the line refers to the fitted value. 
Source: estimates based on the McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Is this relationship a robust pattern of development, or it is just a 
result of spurious correlation? Answering this question is particularly 
important because, as discussed by Hayami (2007), the turning point of the 
relationship often coincides with a marked change in agricultural policy 
patterns, moving from taxation to subsidisation of the agricultural sector. If 
this is the case, then clearly problems emerge in empirically testing the 
relationship because of the role played by agricultural policies. Indeed, 
because these subsidies or taxes are sometimes very large, these policy 
transfers can clearly affect the measurement of the agricultural relative 
income gap. Specifically, with transfers going from the agricultural to the 
non-agricultural sectors in poor countries (and vice versa in rich countries), 
the pre-transfer rural-urban income ratio will be lower (higher) than that 
observed in poor (rich) countries. In medium-income countries, the 
transfers are comparatively low and so the observed income ratio is closer 
to the pre-transfer ratio.  
Consequently, the most important issue in testing the relationship 
between the agricultural relative income gap and the level of development 
is the need to control for the large transfers induced by agricultural 
policies. However, as clearly shown by Hayami (2007) and the large body 
of literature on the political economy of agricultural protection, the policy 
itself is affected by the agricultural rural income gap (see Swinnen, 1994). 
This raises the issue of the endogeneity of the policy transfer to the 
agricultural income gap.  
So it is important to bear in mind that the inclusion of the agricultural 
policy variable in the empirical estimation below cannot be interpreted as 
the effect of policy on the sectoral income gap. In fact, it is included in 
order to estimate the ‘true’ relationship between the pre-transfer or pre-tax 
agricultural income gap and development. Put differently, our main 
objective is to test if, after controlling for the agricultural policy transfer 
and tax and other unobserved factors, the U-shaped relationship continues 
to hold and if so, how it changes with respect to a specification where we 
do not control for agricultural policy. In fact, the particular direction of the 
changes can offer new insight into the effect of agricultural policy on the 
process of convergence in sectoral productivity. 
4.1 Empirical evidence 
In order to verify the robustness of these relationships, the productivity gap 
is regressed on economy-wide labour productivity and country-fixed 
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effects to control for any other omitted factors. The results of this exercise 
are reported in column 1 of Table 19.3. 
Table 19.3 Relationship between agricultural relative productivity gap and 
economic development at the international level 
 
Notes: country-fixed effects included in each regression. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of the linear productivity level and its 
square are negatively and positively related to the income gap, 
respectively, and both are very significant. Therefore, results strongly point 
toward the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the productivity 
gap and the development level. The relationship estimated shows that 
agricultural relative income is negatively related to the level of economy-
wide labour productivity until it reaches a level of $10,405. This level 
represents the turning point of the relationship.55 A process of convergence 
in sectoral productivity starts after this point, with a rapid increase in the 
agricultural relative income gap. Moreover, note that given the inclusion of 
country-fixed effects in the specification, the results suggest that the 
relationship between the agricultural income gap and economic 
development holds true within countries. 
                                                     
55 The estimated turning point is a little higher than that obtained from Figure 5, 
simply because country-fixed effects are always controlled for in the specifications 
of Table 3. 
Dependent variable: Productivity gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log(labour productivity) -3.33*** -3.29*** -1.71*** -1.97*** -0.93*** -0.76*** -11.17*** -10.78*** -4.36*** -4.68***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.54) (0.54) (0.15) (0.15) (0.58) (0.58) (0.85) (0.83)
Log(labour productivity)sq 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
NRA -0.06*** 0.10* 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant 14.93*** 14.68*** 7.63*** 8.81*** 4.38*** 4.09*** 55.12*** 53.09*** 18.86*** 20.51***
(0.72) (0.70) (2.46) (2.48) (0.70) (0.68) (2.94) (2.96) (4.04) (3.89)
No.of Obs. 1030 1030 126 126 301 301 398 398 205 205
R-Sq 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.73 0.76
Turning point [= exp (a/2b] 10,405 9,310 5,167 7,743 10,938 13,360 18,002 18,034 6,124 5,806
All Countries African Asian High income Latin American
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Column (2) adds the level of protection to the relationship, which is 
measured as NRA. Its estimated coefficient is significant and negative, 
confirming that agricultural policy affects relative income. However, what 
is important is that the U-shaped relationship is only marginally affected. 
Due to endogeneity issues discussed above, it does not make much sense to 
give a structural interpretation to the NRA coefficient. However, it should 
be noted that the inclusion of NRA purges the income gap-development 
relationship of the effect of policy. Therefore, by comparing the change in 
the turning point on passing from regression (1) to regression (2), the extent 
to which agricultural policies have accelerated or retarded the process of 
convergence in relative productivity can be evaluated. Controlling for 
policy, the turning point of the relationship falls slightly to $9,310. A literal 
interpretation of this result would be that agricultural policy has slightly 
retarded the process of convergence in productivity level between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in the overall sample, ceteris 
paribus.  
Columns (3), (5), (7), and (9) of Table 19.3 test the relationship by 
respectively considering the sub-sample of African, Asian, high-income, 
and Latin American countries. The relationship is very robust for all the 
country groups considered. Unsurprisingly, the turning point of the 
relationship is very sensitive to the level of development, tending to 
increase on moving from poor African countries ($5,167) to Latin American 
countries ($6,124) and Asian countries ($10,938), to high-income countries 
($18,002). Controlling for policy as in columns (4), (6), (8), and (10), the 
estimated turning point moves to the right for African and Asian countries, 
but slightly to the left for Latin American ones, and remains the same for 
high-income countries. Therefore, the effects of taxation and/or 
subsidisation of the agricultural sector do not display a clear pattern. There 
is some evidence that agricultural policy in African and Asian countries 
worked in favour of the process of convergence in relative income as the 
process of labour adjustment was probably accelerated. However, this 
effect is less apparent for the high-income country group, and appears to 
have had the opposite effect in Latin American countries.  
Table 19.4 reports the results of estimating the income gap-
development relationship for the EU regions (columns 1 and 2), with the 
old EU-15 regions (columns 3 and 4) and the 12 new member state regions 
(columns 5 and 6) being considered separately. Results at the EU regional 
level are impressively similar to those obtained across countries, once again 
confirming that the relationship between the dynamic of the relative 
income gap and economic development represents an important and 
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robust regularity in the development process. Within the EU regions, 
controlling for policy induces a relevant shift of the turning point to the 
right, from €9,094 to €15,783, an effect largely driven by the EU-15 regions 
(compare results in columns 3 and 4). This is not surprising as the 
agricultural subsidies for the new member state regions are of several 
orders of magnitude lower than in the EU-15 regions, and appeared only in 
the second part of the period considered here. Note that after controlling 
for agricultural policy transfers, the shifting of the turning point in the EU-
15 regions is consistent with the idea that government policies have 
accelerated the process of convergence in relative productivity.  
Table 19.4 Relationship between agricultural relative productivity gap and 
economic development at the EU regional level  
 
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) only include observations with existing ‘Total payments’ values; 
columns (5) and (6) include all new member state observations, replacing not reported 
payment with zero value in the years before accession. Country-fixed effects are 
included in each regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the key mechanisms that affect the process of off-farm 
labour reallocation during the process of economic development and its 
relationship with the evolution of the relative income gap. The variation in 
off-farm migration obtained from two different datasets was analysed, one 
relating to 38 countries from all continents, the other relating to 210 EU 
regions. This data was used to study the patterns of off-farm migration 
Dependent variable: Productivity gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(economy-wide labour productivity) -2.37*** -2.32*** -3.26*** -3.17*** -2.09*** -1.95***
(0.62) (0.62) (0.82) (0.82) (0.29) (0.27)
Log(economy-wide labour productivity)sq 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Total payments 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 11.47*** 11.29*** 15.88*** 15.56*** 8.11*** 7.61***
(3.24) (3.23) (4.36) (4.34) (1.21) (1.14)
No.of Obs. 2943 2943 2706 2706 1176 1176
R-Sq 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.65 0.65
Turning point [= exp (a/2b] 9,094 15,783 14,592 20,055 1,745 1,808
All EU regions EU15 regions 12NMSs regions
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over the last 50 years. The analysis has documented interesting and robust 
correlations between the rate of labour reallocation, convergence in the 
relative income gap, and economic development. First, it was found that 
there is a strong positive correlation between the rate of off-farm migration 
and the convergence process in across-sector per capita productivity 
growth. Second, whether or not the supposed U-shaped relationship 
between the relative income gap and economic development is a robust 
stylised fact was empirically tested. Strong support for this relationship 
was found across both samples and also within countries and regions. 
Third, the role played by agricultural policy has also been highlighted, 
giving broad confirmation to the idea that the pattern of taxation and 
subsidisation of agriculture policy affects, and is affected by, the turning 
point of the relationship. Starting from the robust stylised facts established 
in this chapter, future research should analyse how fixed labour relocation 
costs or other potential mechanisms are responsible for the long-term trend 
in the observed agricultural income gap.  
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